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FEDERAL TAXATION-TRANSFEREE LIABILITY OF INSURANCE BENEFICIARY-
Nearly six years after taxpayer died income tax deficiencies were de-
termined against his estate. Since his estate was insolvent the Commissioner 
sought to impose transferee liability under section 311 of the 1939 code 
(now I.R.C. section 6901)1 on plaintiff, taxpayer's widow, as beneficiary 
of" her husband's life insurance. The Tax Court,2 applying federal law, 
held plaintiff liable for the entire deficiency since the proceeds received 
l I.R.C. (1939), §311 was included in the 1954 code without substantial change. Now 
I.R.C., §6901, it provides: . 
"(a) The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this 
section provided, ·be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the 
same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the 
liability was incurred: 
"(l)(A) Transferees.-The liability, at law or in equity of a transferee of property-
(i) of a taxpayer in the case of a tax imposed by subtitle A (relating to income taxes) .•• :• 
2 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 1[56,023 (1956). 
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by her exceeded that amount. The court of appeals,S applying state law, 
reversed and ruled that the beneficiary was not a "transferee" within the 
meaning of section 311 even to the extent of the cash surrender value 
of the insurance. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
affirmed, three justices dissenting.4 Recovery of unpaid federal income 
taxes from a taxpayer's transferee, in the absence of a federal tax lien, 
can be sustained only to the extent that state law imposes such liability.5 
Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958).6 
Prior to enactment in 1926 of the predecessor of section 6901 of the 
1954 code, 7 if the taxpayer himself did not have sufficient funds to pay 
the tax due, the Commissioner had to seek recovery from a transferee 
of the taxpayer's property in a court of equity under the "trust-fund" 
doctrine.8 This was a cumbersome and involved process compared with 
the summary procedure available against the taxpayer himself. The 1926 
act was designed to implement the procedure for suing the transferee. 
It failed, however, to define the substantive liability of the transferee.9 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision but 
specifically reserved the question whether federal or state law should 
control in determining the extent of transferee liability.10 Prior to the 
decision in the principal case a majority of the courts of appeals11 had 
felt that state law should apply, while the Tax Court12 and a minority 
of the courts of appeals13 thought federal law should govern. The initial 
3 Stern v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 322. 
4 Justice Black, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Whittaker, dissented. 
5 The Kentucky statute in the principal case limited the life insurance beneficiary's 
liability to creditors of the insured to the amount of premiums paid by the insured in 
fraud of creditors. Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §§140, 297, 297.150. In the principal case there 
was no showing the taxpayer had paid any premiums in fraud of creditors. 
6 The rule of the Stern case was applied in United States v. Ott, (D.C. Mich. 1958) 
27 U.S. LAW WEEK 2161, holding that there was no transferee liability on an insurance 
beneficiary under applicable state law. 
7 Revenue Act of 1926, §280. 
s For an example of the application of the "trust-fund" doctrine, see Updike v. 
United States, (8th. Cir. 1925) 8 F. (2d) 913. 
9 Pearlman v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 560; Weil v. Commissioner, 
(2d Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 944; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931). The 1926 
act was "to provide for the enforcement of such liability to the Government by the 
procedure provided in the act for the enforcement of tax deficiencies" [S. Rep. 52, 69th 
Cong., 1st sess., p. 30 (1926)] "without in any way changing the extent of such liability 
of the transferee under existing law. • . ." [H. Rep. 356, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 43 
(1926) (emphasis added)]. 
10 Phillips v. Commissioner, note 9 supra. 
ll E.g., United States v. Truax, (5th Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 229; Rowen v. Commis-
sioner, (2d Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 641; Tyson v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 
16; Botz v. Helvering, (8th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 538; Tooley v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 
1941) 121 F. (2d) 350; United States v. New, (7th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 166. 
12 Mary Stoumen, 27 T.C. 1014 (1957); Aura Grimes Bales, 22 T.C. 355 (1954); Christine 
D. -Muller, 10 T.C. 678 (1948). 
13 United States v. Bess, (3d Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 675, affd. 357 U.S. 51 (1958); Pearl-
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problem presented is to determine what the congressional committees 
meant when they said in 1926 that courts should continue to apply 
"existing law" regarding the extent of the transferee's liability. This 
problem is nearly impossible to solve. The pre-1926 cases did not involve 
"exemption" statutes in which the court would have been forced to 
choose between federal or state law. These cases generally were actions 
against shareholders of dissolved or insolvent corporations based on 
the "trust-fund" doctrine, in which federal courts applied a "general law" 
since that doctrine had almost uniform application in all states.14 The 
situation did not become acute until the Commissioner sought to recover 
deficiencies from the insurance beneficiaries of delinquent taxpayers, and 
was confronted with "exemption" statutes which varied among the states. 
Since reference to "existing law" would be of no assistance in resolving 
the question whether federal or state law should apply to determine 
the substantive liability of a transferee, the difficulty ultimately stemmed 
from the failure of Congress precisely to define such substantive liability. 
The dissenting justices in the instant case argued that in light of the 
general scheme of uniform taxation, revenue laws should not be taken 
as subject to state limitation unless Congress made it clear from the tenor 
of the act that it desired the courts to do so. This position has found 
support in the Supreme Court on previous occasions.15 The majority 
adopted the opposite view, asserting that if Congress intended federal 
law to apply, it should have made it clear in the statute.16 In support of 
this position it may be argued that since Congress did provide that the 
transferee "shall be personally liable" with respect to estate and gift 
taxes,11 the absence in the income tax context of a declaration of federal 
liability in both section 311 and its successor, section 6901, shows con-
gressional intent to make state law applicable. As the majority pointed 
out, the extent and incidence of federal taxes are sometimes affected 
by state law.18 What the Court failed to note was that although state law 
may determine the relevant facts, uniform federal law is applied to these 
facts and divergent results are reached only because the underlying facts 
may be different.19 
man v. Commissioner, note 9 supra; K.ieferdorf v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1944) 142 F. 
(2d) 723, cert. den. 323 U.S. 733 (1944). 
14 See 94 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 434 (1946). 
15 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. !199 (1941). 
Stating the general proposition that federal courts should apply federal law is Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. United States, !118 U.S. !163 (1943). 
16 Even the writers in the area have been in disagreement as to which is the better 
view. See 55 CoL. L. REv. 98 (1955), 68 HARv. L. REv. 1280 (1955), 52 N.W. UNIV. L. 
REV. 69!1 (1957), 36 TAXES 89 (1958). 
17 See I.R.C., §6324(a)(2) and §6324(b). 
18 See Norman, "State Legislation and Federal Taxation," 26 TAXES !15 (1948). 
19 This distinction was carefully discussed in Blair v. Commissioner, !100 U.S. 5 (1937), 
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Most of the recent cases of transferee liability have involved insurance 
beneficiaries, and the courts may have been moved in their decisions by 
the plight of the widow left with nothing but a small amount of in-
surance proceeds.20 The policy of protecting insurance proceeds in the 
hands of certain beneficiaries from the reach of creditors of the insured 
has had legislative backing in a majority of the states and the decision 
in the principal case effectuates this rather general statutory policy. 
Moreover, the end result will likely be the uniformity the Commissioner 
contended was necessary. It will not be surprising to see the few states 
not already having protective statutes for life insurance beneficiaries 
enact them at the insistence of its tax-conscious citizenry. It is questionable, 
however, whether it is wise in an area of federal taxation for state law 
to control liability when the history of our tax law has been one of uniform 
treatment no matter where the taxpayer happened to reside. If it is 
desirable to exclude an insurance beneficiary from transferee liability, 
perhaps Congress should now act in" this area rather than leave this to 
state laws which vary at least in detail. It has done so with regard to 
federal tax liens, the problem before the Court in the companion case 
of United States v. Bess.21 
The result in the principal case does not leave the Commissioner com-
pletely without remedy in the insurance area. In the Bess case the Court 
held that the state "exemption" statutes would not apply to the cash 
surrender value of a policy where a federal tax lien had attached prior to 
the time of "transfer."22 Thus in this rather limited situation recovery 
is permitted of the same amount from the beneficiary as could have been 
collected from the deficient taxpayer. But the government will be injured 
in a situation like that in the principal case where assessment and demand 
for the tax in question are not made before the taxpayer's death. In some 
cases this may be due to government delay, while in others it may be due 
simply to a lack of sufficient time or facilities to determine the deficiency 
prior to death. It will be interesting to see what the government will 
do to protect itself in these situations. The results of these two cases 
have certainly left the door open for federal legislation in the area. 
John Gelder, S.Ed. 
and Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942), where the Court said state law should be 
applied in determining what rights or interests the parties have, but federal law should 
be applied to determine what interest should be taxed. 
20 It has even been suggested that Congress never intended the transferee liability 
provisions to cover insurance beneficiaries. 1955 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 168. 
21 357 U.S. 51 (1958). 
22 State exemption statutes have consistently been held ineffective against a statutory 
tax lien. E.g., Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co., (2d Cir. 1957) 241 F. (2d) 504; Knox v. 
Great West Life Ins. Co., (6th Cir. 1954) 212 F. (2d) 784; United States v. Heffron, (9th 
Cir. 1947) 158 F. (2d) 657, cert. den. 331 U.S. 831 (1947). 
